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Korean soldiers observe North Korean troops installing barriers near the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone. / Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Lee Jae-myung administration, which recently declared its intention to pursue nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), has once again called on North Korea to return to dialogue—only to face widespread skepticism that Pyongyang will respond. On November 17, the Ministry of National Defense proposed inter-Korean military talks to establish a clear baseline for the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), following a series of North Korean incursions into the Demilitarized Zone.

Announcing the proposal, Kim Yong-chul, head of the ministry’s Policy Planning Bureau, stated, “To prevent accidental clashes and ease military tensions, we officially propose that the military authorities of the South and North convene talks to discuss setting a reference line for the MDL.”

Kim explained that many of the original MDL markers installed after the 1953 Armistice have been lost or damaged over the decades, leading to “differences in South and North perceptions of the boundary in certain areas.” He said the South is prepared to coordinate the meeting’s schedule and venue through Panmunjom and urged the North to respond swiftly and positively for the sake of stability on the peninsula.

Military officials said they made the proposal due to concerns about escalating tensions following recent North Korean intrusions and the South’s warning shots in response. South Korea believes that these incursions stem from differing interpretations of the MDL.

After the armistice, the Military Armistice Commission installed 1,292 markers using concrete posts and steel plates. Repair efforts ceased in 1973 after North Korean soldiers opened fire on a UN Command repair team, leaving only about 200 markers identifiable today.

In 2004, South Korean defense authorities worked with the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to align the MDL on original maps with current topography, applying both remaining MDL markers and original map coordinates to military charts. North Korean forces, however, have crossed the MDL as recognized by the South more than ten times this year alone. Despite repeated notifications through UN Command channels, Pyongyang has not responded.

Since 2000, the two Koreas have held 52 military talks, including 40 working-level meetings and 10 general-level talks. Their last meeting took place on October 26, 2018, at Panmunjom, culminating in the September 19 military agreement aimed at reducing tensions. But Pyongyang cut off all communication channels in 2020 and blew up the inter-Korean liaison office, severing official contact.

This marks the Lee administration’s first formal proposal for dialogue. Officials say the move reflects the urgent need to manage tensions at the MDL amid the total breakdown in inter-Korean communication.

Still, expectations are low. North Korea has recently bristled at a flurry of messages from Seoul and Washington: the announcement of a Korean SSN program, a joint visit by the South Korean and U.S. defense chiefs to Panmunjom, and the reaffirmation of the “denuclearization of North Korea” principle at the Security Consultative Meeting.

Experts say Pyongyang sees little incentive to engage. Responding to talks could weaken its push to redefine the two Koreas as “hostile separate states,” a position it has stressed repeatedly.

Hong Min, senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, “There is no significant political or military benefit for North Korea in agreeing to talks. Doing so would revive the framework of ‘inter-Korean military talks,’ which undermines its strategic message that the two Koreas are hostile, unrelated states.”

He added that North Korea is likely to continue ignoring Seoul’s overtures because the situation near the MDL—despite tensions from warning shots—is framed by Pyongyang as part of its own effort to ‘borderize’ the DMZ, not a crisis requiring dialogue.

Hong also noted that talks would not align with North Korea’s upcoming political timetable. “Pyongyang is likely to finalize legal and institutional steps to cement the ‘hostile two-state’ doctrine at the Party Central Committee meeting in mid-December, the 9th Party Congress in January, and the Supreme People’s Assembly session in the first half of next year. Engaging in talks with Seoul at this moment would contradict that strategic trajectory.”